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NOTES
Civil Procedure-Trial Court Discretion in Rule 54(b) Certifica-
tion: Extension of the Panichella Requirement of an Infrequent,
Harsh Case
Under the common law the jurisdiction of an appellate court was
based on the final disposition of the entire action by the lower court
from which the appeal was taken.1 Among the many devices2 that have
been used to circumvent this general rule of finality is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b).3 The purpose of this rule was to avoid problems
possibly developed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the
new opportunities for liberal joinder of claims in multiple claims ac-
tions.4 By allowing judgment to be entered on fewer than all of the
claims in a multiple claims action, rule 54(b) solves the dilemma of delay
in entry of judgment on one claim while adjudication is pending on an
unrelated claim that is part of the same action.' This rule has evolved to
operate in such a manner that entry of judgment under the rule is now
granted at -the discretion of the trial court.6 This evolution has created
the interrelated problems of determining within what bounds the trial
1. Holcombe v. McKusick, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 552, 554-55 (1857); United States
v. Girault, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 21, 31-32 (1850).
2. Other methods of appeal that do not require common-law finality as a
condition include 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292 & 1651 (1970).
3. Rule 54(b) presently reads:
Judgment upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express .deter-
mination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
4. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432 (1956). Among these
rules are FED. R. Crv. P. 13, 14, 18 & 20.
5. 351 U.S. at 432-33; FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Notes of Advisory Comm. on 1946
Amendment.
6. See text accompanying notes 19-31 infra.
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court may grant 54(b) certification and by what standards the appellate
court may police the exercise of this discretion. t Both of these considera-
tions were highlighted by Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric
Co.," a decision in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals added a
new limitation to the district court's power to grant 54(b) certification."
In Allis-Chalmers, the trial court granted summary judgment on
the original claim for the price of goods purchased by Philadelphia
Electric Company (PECO) from Allis-Chalmers Corporation (A-C).
Despite a pending counterclaim for damages based on a dispute con-
cerning defective goods A-C had previously sold to PECO,' 0 54(b)
certification was granted on the original claim so that A-C could execute
that judgment.11 The appellate court found, however, that the trial
court abused its discretion in this certification.' 2 The Third Circuit
established the rule that abuse of discretion exists when the district court
gives no clear articulation of the reasons for the 54(b) certification.' 3
While the court of appeals recognized that the district court had given its
reason for the certification by finding that there was no factual integra-
tion of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims, it considered the
7. Cf. text accompanying notes 32-42 infra. The district court has the discretion
not to certify that which would otherwise be appealable. See B.B. Adams Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Department of HUD, 501 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
8. 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975).
9. Although in this opinion there is found the initial requirement that the district
court articulate the reasons for 54(b) certification, 521 F.2d at 364-65; see note 13 and
accompanying text infra, the unprecedented holding is that there is always a presumption
against certification when there exists a pending claim that may be set off against the
adjudicated claims. 521 F.2d at 366; cf. notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text infra.
10. The counterclaim was based on the allegation that a switch gear manufactured
by A-C for PECO malfunctioned due to the improper construction of circuit breakers.
The major dispute, however, centered on conflicting warranty provisions in the contract
form submitted by A-C and a subsequent purchase order form submitted by PECO. The
timing of confirmation of the contract and the applicable warranties were among the
controverted issues. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim at
2-6; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim
at 1-4.
11. Summary judgment was also entered on a claim for repair services by A-C for
PECO. These services were also unrelated to the counterclaim. Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 64 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
12. 521 F.2d at 367. In a subsequent proceeding the trial court reinstated the
54(b) certification. See note 59 infra. There was no appeal of the new entry of
judgment since the claims were settled one week after the order for 54(b) certification
was reinstated. See note 58 infra.
13. 521 F.2d at 364. It has, however, been twice suggested that the district court
in granting 54(b) certification should facilitate better review of the proper exercise of
discretion by giving a "brief reasoned statement in support of its determination." Gumer
v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1974); Schwartz v. Compagnie
Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 1968).
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factual relationship between the claims to be only "one factor to be
considered." 14  By determining that this factor alone was insufficient
for entry of judgment because of the existence of the counterclaim that
might allow PECO to recover all it owed A-C, the Third Circuit placed
a new restriction on the district court's power to grant 54(b) certifica-
tion.15 A possibility of set-off required the party seeking certification to
have proved economic or equitable harm by delay. The failure of the
district court to consider those factors resulted in inadequate proof of
the infrequent, harsh case"' that some courts have required for the
proper exercise of discretion in 54(b) certification.1 7
The Allis-Chalmers decision is the product of a rule that has devel-
oped from a problem-plagued statutory and case history. Rule 54(b)
was designed to solve the problem of delay in the termination of parts of
the new multiple claims actions, which were permitted by the liberal
rules of joinder.'" As originally written, the rule directed that a determi-
nation of all issues material to one of the multiple claims would allow that
claim to be treated as final and appealable.' 9 An order determining all
such issues not only allowed appeal without delay; it also caused the
time for appeal to run with regard to the settled claim."0 Problems
14. 521 F.2d at 365.
15. The court decided that a possibility of set-off "weighs heavily against the grant
of 54(b) certification." Id. at 366. The court recognized that this case was distinguish-
able from previous set-off situations in that it involved permissible rather than compulso-
ry counterclaims. But it viewed the undesirability of an award that might later be
reimbursed to be the dominant factor. Id. But see cases cited notes 38 & 39 infra.
16. 521 F.2d at 366. For a discussion of the development of the requirement of
the infrequent, harsh case for 54(b) certification, see notes 43-53 and accompanying text
infra.
17. See cases cited note 43 infra.
18. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
19. Rule 54(b) as promulgated in 1939 read as follows:
Judgment at Various Stages. When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, the court at any stage, upon a determination of the
issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out of the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, may enter
a judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the action
with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to
the remaining claims ...
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 433 (1956). The circularity in the
rule's requirement of a "judgment disposing of [a] claim" may be one of the problems in
determining what was final. This problem is demonstrated by the definition of "judg-
ment" in rule 54(a). "'Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(a). It seems clear, however, that the
problems in determining what is final are many. Cf. cases cited note 41 infra; Crick,
The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE LJ. 539 (1932).
20. E.g., Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950); Reeves
v, Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 (1942).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
arose because of the difficulty of the concept of determination of all
material issues.2 Counsel who erroneously believed that an order did
not resolve all issues with regard to one claim would not appeal until
completion of the entire action, only to find that the statute of limita-
tions barred the appeal as to the previously terminated claim.22 The
natural development of such a possibility was that the careful attorney
would appeal many orders that did not completely dispose of a claim for
fear that the time for appeal would run. With the appellate courts
being bombarded with unnecessary, but properly cautious appeals, the
first of two amendments23 to rule 54(b) was adopted. To protect
parties against loss of appellate rights, the amended rule provided that
the district court "may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or
more but less than all of the claims only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for
the entry of judgment. 24 While the signal created by 54(b) certifica-
tion gave clear notice of the termination of part of an action,2" the new
rule created additional questions about the undefined limits of the new
powers that had been placed with the district court.
In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey26 the United States Supreme
Court dealt with two issues created by the new rule: (1) whether the
rule delegated an irrevocable power of certification to the district court,2 7
21. See C. WaiGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcCE & PROCEDURE § 2653 (1973).
22. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434 (1956).
23. The second amendment in 1961 is not relevant here. That amendment
expanded rule 54(b) explicitly to allow certification in cases involving multiple parties
and one or more claims. See note 3 supra.
24. 351 U.S. at 434-35 (emphasis omitted).
25. Id.
26. 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
27. Although the Supreme Court's resolution of this issue seemed to assume the
answer, id. at 436, there was considerable disagreement prior to the Sears decision. Some
circuits felt that 54(b) certification could properly be granted only if the claim were
separate and distinct (i.e., met the previous standards of finality). Gold Seal Co. v.
Weeks, 209 F.2d 802, 810-11 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Flegenheimer v. General Mills, Inc., 191
F.2d 237, 241 (2d Cir. 1951) (Learned Hand saying that "nowhere in [amended rule
54(b)] can be found a suggestion that the [trial] judge can make that 'final' which was
not 'final' before."). Others felt that the only limitation on the discretion of the trial
court was that the judgment be entered on a claim, at which point the 54(b) certification
was conclusive of appellate jurisdiction. Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267,
269-70 (3d Cir. 1952); Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir.
1951) (the Flegenheimer opinion indicates that there was disagreement within the
Second Circuit). The Bendix Aviation court found the fact that the trial court "may
direct the entry of a final judgment" (emphasis added) to be persuasive evidence that
amended rule 54(b) granted almost complete discretion to that court. Judge Hand in
Flegenheimer was, however, convinced that the rule was one of limitation because of the
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and (2) whether the rule modified the prior standard of finality re-
quired for the district court's discretionary certification. The Court
established that the district court's power of certification is not absolute
and that the appellate court should dismiss an appeal pursuant to rule
54(b) if it finds "(1) that the judgment... was not a decision upon
a 'claim for relief,' (2) that the decision was not . . . an ultimate
disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple
claims action, or (3) that the District Court abused its discretion in
certifying the order."28  With regard to the standard of finality under
the amended rule, the Court held that the amended rule did "not relax
the [28 U.S.C. section 1291] finality required of each decision."29 It did,
however, recognize that a final order on a claim could be entered under
the amended rule although it would not have been appealable under
the original rule. Application of this modification was permissible
only "[i]f the District Court certifies a final order... and the Court
of Appeals is satisfied that there has been no abuse of discretion."30 The
Supreme Court thus delegated to the district courts and courts of appeal
the power of determining the specific fact situations that qualify for
54(b) certification.31
The guidelines for this determination, however, had been fixed by
the Supreme Court in its recommendation that, to determine whether
54(b) certification should be granted, the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review should be balanced against the danger of denying
requirement of a "final judgment." Because of the circular definition of "final judgment"
in rule 54(a), see note 19 supra, this reasoning does not appear sound. Judge Hand's
understanding of the function of the rule in the judicial system is, however, demonstrated
by the ability of the trial court to distort the function of the rule. Zangardi v. Tobriner,
330 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
28. 351 U.S. at 436. The diminution of the trial judge's discretion was argued to
be a poor decision for several reasons, including (1) the litigants will have to bear the
expense of preparing their briefs and arguments with little or no idea that the court of
appeals will hear their claim, Note, Separate Review of Claims in Multiple Claims Suits:
Appellate lurisdiction Under Amended Rule 54(b), 62 YALE LJ. 263 (1953), and (2)
since the district court judge is in the best position to understand the fairness to the
parties, discretion, although open to abuse, is best delegated to that authority. Bendix
Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 195 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1952); cf. Note, Federal
Procedure-udgment on Less Than All Multiple Claims is Appealable Under Amended
Rule 54(b) Even if Claims Left Pending Arose from the Same Transaction, 42 VA. L.
REv. 982 (1956).
29. 351 U.S. at 435. This result was also supported by Justice Frankfurter in
his dissenting opinion, id. at 444.
30. Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445, 452
(1956) (companion case to Sears).
31. Since the Sears opinion the Supreme Court has not reviewed a single 54(b)
certification to determine its propriety.
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justice to the parties.32  In the application of this balancing process,
several factors have been suggested for the trial court to consider in the
proper exercise of its discretion. 3 Among these factors are the similari-
ty of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims34 and the possibility that
the appellate review of the terminated claim might be mooted by subse-
quent developments in the trial court." Generally courts view either of
the above situations as wasteful of appellate court time since, in the for-
mer, an early appeal is potentially duplicative of a later appeal on the
unadjudicated claim, and, in the latter, an early appeal may be unneces-
sarily resolved.3" On the other hand, efficiency of the trial court
proceedings has occasionally warranted 54(b) certification despite the
possible existence of duplicative appellate court proceedings.3 7 An
additional factor weighing against 54(b) certification is the existence of
a counterclaim that may create a set-off against the adjudicated claim. It
is considered unfair to the losing party to make an award that may be
reduced by a subsequent judgment in favor of that party.3 8 When the
32. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
33. Dilatory activities by one of the parties may be a consideration in the propriety
of 54(b) certification against that party. United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1972). For other factors not discussed in the text following this note, see notes 42
& 45 infra.
34. Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 498 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1974);
MeNellis v. Merchants Nat1 Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1967);
Rabekoff v. Lazere & Co., 323 F.2d 865, 866 (2d Cir. 1963); Cott Beverage Corp. v.
Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 243 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam); cf. Levin
v. Baum, 513 F.2d 92, 96 (7th Cir. 1975).
35. Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939, 943 (2d Cir. 1968);
Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958); Cott Beverage
Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 243 F.2d 795, 796 (2d Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
36. See cases cited notes 34 & 35 supra.
37. Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir.
1973); Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 132 F. Supp.
921, 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 309
(1962).
38. The set-off factor has been given controlling weight only in circumstances in
which the set-off had its basis in transactions that were also the basis of the claim that
the set-off may reduce. Spencer, White & Prentis, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 498 F.2d 358, 364
(2d Cir. 1974) (the amount owing on the contract might be set off by alleged damages
suffered in the execution of that contract); TPO Inc. v. FDIC, 487 F.2d 131, 134 (3d
Cir. 1973) (cashier's checks might be set off by an alleged fraudulent scheme in which
the checks played a part); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Church, Rickards & Co., 58 F.R.D.
594, 596-99 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (in an action in which damages for breach of the contract
might be set off for debts owing under that same contract, the court granted 54(b)
certification but recognized the equitable stance of the set-off claim by staying execution
under FED. R. Civ. P. 62(h)); cf. Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib.
Co., 355 F.2d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 1965) (the recovery for alleged fraud in obtaining the
contract might be greater than the amount owing on the contract; the case did not
involve a 54(b) certification); Schroeter v. Ralph Wilson Plastics, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 323,
326 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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set-off possibility has occurred in the context of unrelated claims, how-
ever, one court has found that the alleged claim of set-off for the
purpose of delaying payment for goods bought in a separate transaction
was an unjust reason to delay entry of judgment.8 9
The great number. of cases, which, "it must be conceded, are not
altogether harmonious,' 40 demonstrate the difficulty of balancing the
efficiency of the judicial process and justice for the parties in the
determination of finality.4' This difficulty may in part be caused by the
tendency of the courts to develop generalities in some cases only to find
those generalities inapplicable when a case is presented in which appli-
cation of that general rule would create inequities.42 Subsequent to the
Sears decision, an influential generality was developed by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Panichella v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.43
39. "The merits of the antitrust action [based on a refusal by defendant to sell its
products to plaintiff] have no effect on plaintiff's duty to pay for goods he ordered and
received prior to the alleged antitrust violations by defendant." Almar Supply Co. v.
Weber-Stephen Products Co., 15 FED. RULES Sav. 2d 54b.32 (E.D. Pa. 1971). This
distinction on the basis of the relationship of the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims is
further supported by a negative inference that may be drawn from TPO Inc. v. FDIC,
487 F.2d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1973). In refusing 54(b) certification because of a set-off
claim, that court said, "It is critical . . . that . . . [the party whose adjudicated claim is
based on the checks is] the party which participated in the allegedly fraudulent transac-
tion [the basis of the unadjudicated counterclaim] in which the checks played a part."
40. McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 545 (1892), quoted in
Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
41. Compare Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958),
with Schwartz v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968).
Compare Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 484 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1973),
with CBS v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 271 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1959).
42. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950). "Me
believe that our disposition. . . will make possible a more expeditious and just result for
all parties." Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1974).
This court thus showed an inclination to examine the decision of the substantive appeal
prior to a decision as to its appealability. By first resolving the issue of dismissal of the
third-party defendant, the appellate court knew that an initial trial in the absence of this
party would be inefficient, see cases cited note 37 supra. The reversal on the substantive
claim also mooted the possibility of a repeated appellate review. This inefficiency,
dominant in other circumstances, see note 45 infra, was irrelevant because the principal
party not participating in the appellate proceeding was not adversely affected. In
rejecting this generality, the court laid a foundation for another generality, the Allis-
Chalmers requirement for articulation of dominant factors. See note 13 and accom-
panying text supra. See generally text accompanying notes 61-63 infra.
43. 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960). The
influence of this case is fairly clear, e.g., Gas-A-Car, Inc. v. American Petrofina, Inc.,
484 F.2d 1102, 1105 (10th Cir. 1973); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 398 F.2d 729, 734 (3d
Cir. 1968); Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. H. Muehlstein & Co., 280 F.2d 755, 758-59
(2d Cir. 1960); Gass v. National Container Corp., 271 F.2d 231, 233 (7th Cir. 1959);
Liquilux Gas Serv. v. Tropical Gas Co., 48 F.R.D. 330, 332-33 (D.P.R. 1969) (mem.).
Prior to Allis-Chalmers, however, this author found no reference to the infrequent, harsh
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The trial court had granted 54(b) certification on a summary judgment
dismissing the third-party defendant, while the original claim on which
the third-party claim was based remained unadjudicated. 44 This certifi-
cation had the potential of producing an unnecessary burden for the
appellate court since the issue of third-party liability might be mooted by
failure of the underlying claim.45 But the court of appeals in finding
the certification to be an abuse of discretion created some inflammatory
and misleading dicta. Searching through the notes of the committee
that drafted the 1946 amendment, the Third Circuit discovered that the
draftsmen had stated that the rule should be used only in the exercise of
a discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent, harsh case.40
The natural implication of this statement is that satisfaction of the
standard of 28 U.S.C. section 1291 finality is but one of two criteria for
proper discretion in certification. The second criterion is the necessity
of injustice to the party if there is delay in entry of judgment. The
subsequent judicial adoption of the infrequent, harsh case standard has
the effect of placing a burden of proof on the party seeking 54(b)
certification.47 And it is this burden of proof that led to misapplication
of rule 54(b) in Allis-Chalmers.
The misapplication is clearly demonstrated by comparing the pur-
pose of the amended rule and its interpretation in Sears with the holding
in Allis-Chalmers. The history of the adoption of the amendment and
all the comments of the advisory committee indicate that "[tjhe obvious
purpose [of the 1946 amendment to rule 54(b)] is to reduce as far as
possible the uncertainty and hazard assumed by a litigant" who is
unsure of the finality of a judgment.48 In fact, the historical context of
the amendment seems to indicate that the reference to the necessity of an
infrequent, harsh case was inadvertent and was intended to reduce the
exorbitant flow of appeals of non-final adjudications that had developed
case requirement as grounds for denying 54(b) certification in the context of adjudicated
and unadjudicated claims that had no similarity of facts or issues, See note 38 supra.
44. 252 F.2d at 454.
45. The court recognized two additional reasons indicating that preliminary appeal
was an inefficient use of the judicial process. Because plaintiff was not a party to his
appeal, a decision as to the issue of a release (the basis of the dismissal of the third-party
defendant) could not be binding as between the principal parties. Thus there might be a
need for an additional, inefficient appeal on the same issue. Second, the trial on the
main claim below was being delayed. Id. at 455.
46. Id.
47. This burden of proof coincides with the interpretation of the court in Allis.
Chalmers. 521 F.2d at 365.
48. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950).
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under the former rule.49 The advisory committee that drafted the
1946 amendment expressly "concluded that a retention of the older
federal rule [which allowed termination and no delay in the appeal of a
distinctly separate claim] was desirable . . ... In addition, although
the Court in Sears allowed the court of appeals to review 54(b) certifi-
cation for abuse of discretion, it clearly implied that adjudicated claims
satisfying the requirements of rule 54(b) in its original form would
also be appealable under the amended rule, provided the district court
made the required certification.-1 Although the Panichella standard of
infrequent, harsh case may be applicable in the case of judgments that
would not have been final under the original rule 54(b), the extension
to judgments that would have been final is unwarranted. Allis-Chal-
mers, with factually unrelated claims, clearly falls in the latter catego-
ry.52  Thus the "set-off which weighs heavily against 54(b) certifica-
tion" might be properly limited to the context of a factually related,
unadjudicated counterclaim. 3
In this context, the efficiency of the judicial process and the
equities between the parties would normally justify delay of appeal until
completion of the entire action. There may be further developments in
the trial of the unadjudicated counterclaim relevant to the adjudicated
claim. A possibility that the appellate court may not have all informa-
tion relevant to the claim indicates the potential inefficiency of early
appellate review.54 In cases in which the adjudicated and unadjudicat-
ed claims are not related and in which subsequent trial court proceed-
ings will not moot the issues that are the subject of appeal, efficiency
within the judicial process is not a factor since the issues before the
49. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
50. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(b), Notes of Advisory Comm. on 1946 Amendment.
51. 351 U.S. at 436. In both Sears, id. at 428-29, and the companion case, Cold
Metal, 351 U.S. at 446, each court of appeals had affirmed its 54(b) jurisdiction.
Therefore, the ability of the appellate court to find abuse of discretion when the
certified claim would have been appealable under the former rule 54(b) was not
addressed in either opinion. The generally narrow scope of review for abuse of
discretion would seem to indicate that there should be minimal bounds within which the
district courts should have absolute freedom. Since the intent of the framers of the
original rule was substantively adopted by the drafters of the amended rule, see text
accompanying note 50 supra, a sensible boundary for absolute discretion might parallel
the boundary of the original rule. Outside of that limitation the Cold Storage opinion
definitely allows certification to be granted, subject to appellate review for the proper
exercise of discretion.
52. See notes 10 & 11 and accompanying text supra.
53. See cases cited note 38 supra.
54. See cases cited notes 34 & 35 supra.
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appellate court cannot be affected by subsequent developments at trial.5s
The only remaining question in this situation is thus the fairness to the
parties in allowing the set-off to delay execution of the settled claim."0
As in Allis-Chalmers,7 when one party asserting a contested claim has
created the uncontested claim of the adverse party by failing to pay for
goods received, it may be inferred that this is an attempt to collect on the
contested claim prior to its adjudication."8 Under such circumstances
the equities favor entry of judgment on the uncontested claim. When
the adjudicated claim involves unsettled issues making reversal a real
possibility or when the party seeking 54(b) certification is of question-
able solvency so that satisfaction of the set-off claim may not be success-
ful, fairness tends to favor delay of execution until completion of the
entire action.59
55. Almar Supply Co. v. Weber-Stephen Products Co., 15 FED. RuLES SEnv. 2d
54b.32 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
56. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 10 & 11 supra.
58. Justice Gibbons, in his dissent to the Allis-Chalmers decision, clearly felt that
resolution of 54(b) certification in these circumstances was partially based on which
party would finance the liquidated debts. 521 F.2d at 367. A settlement of the entire
action one week after judgment was entered on the original claim for the second time,
see Docket of Proceedings, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (E.D. Pa.
1973-75), seemed to support the contention that a basis for the counterclaim was delay
of payment. This was, however, clearly not the case in the Allis-Chalmers action.
Although Judge Newcomer, in granting 54(b) certification, noted the injustice of A-C
financing the indebtedness, see note 59 infra, the party seeking certification felt that
"recertification .. .had no real bearing on the settlement." Letter from Stephen Cozen,
attorney for Allis-Chalmers Corp., to William Dannelly, author, Feb. 10, 1976, on file
at U.N.C. Law Library. The settlement, approximately 50% of the counterclaim and
100% of the main claim, shows that the counterclaim was not specious, and the settle-
ment was therefore probably based on a recognition that the counterclaim was likely to
be tied up in the courts for several years. Id.
59. Following dismissal by the Third Circuit in Allis-Chalmers, Allis-Chalmers
presented a motion for certification of its judgment in accordance with the standards
suggested by the appellate court. After submission of briefs and oral arguments the trial
court analyzed and balanced all of the factors suggested. Order Granting Final
Judgment Under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 1975) (unpublished).
The adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were found to have both unrelated facts
and issues. For that reason an appeal from summary judgment on the debt would
involve neither waste of time nor duplication of effort by the appellate court, id. at 2-3.
Although the issue of indebtedness would not be mooted by completion of trial on the
counterclaim, PECO cleverly argued that another issue would not need to be resolved.
That issue was the contention by PECO that Pennsylvania law controlled on the point
that summary judgment could not be entered during the pendency of a counterclaim. The
court recognized this argument as specious. To allow the mootness of this issue to
prevent 54(b) certification would permit a party to postpone execution simply by making
the objection to summary judgment. Since this objection would always disappear upon
adjudication of the counterclaim, the court of appeals would never have the opportunity
to resolve the issue. Thus an issue that had the purpose of delaying execution could
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Although the specific limits of permissible 54(b) certification are
important, the effectiveness of its application is clearly dependent on the
interaction of the district court and the court of appeals. Putting
discretion in certification within the power of the district court is sensi-
ble because that court is familiar with the case.60 As the bounds of
finality and the purposes of the rule have proved to be sufficiently vague
to subject the rule to misuse," review of district court certification for
proper discretion is clearly warranted.62  For this reason the Allis-
Chalmers requirement that the 54(b) certification be accompanied by
articulation of the dominant factors is soundly premised. It is surely
warranted that the affected parties be notified of the guidelines for the
decision. Similarly, for the reviewing court to determine whether prop-
er discretion was used, it must know the reasons for which judgment
was entered.63 However, the danger remains, as demonstrated by Allis-
Chalmers, that the court of appeals in its review might stifle the effec-
tiveness of rule 54(b) by imposing excessive restrictions on the district
court's ability to issue certifications. 6"
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delay execution without resolution of the merits of the issue. An appellate decision on
the question would solve this problem. The court further distinguished Panichella in
that the mooted issue in that case involved the ultimate liability of a party, id. at 3-6.
The court summarily rejected the possibility that the dismissed claim involved any issues
that might necessitate a second appellate hearing on the same issue. The counterclaim
set-off position was similarly rejected, see note 11 supra. In balancing the other factors,
the court noted: (1) The certification would not affect trial on the counterclaim, since
that trial was not being delayed; (2) A-C was denied the use of the money admittedly
owed by PECO, while PECO had already been fully compensated by its insurance carrier
for the damages that were the basis of the counterclaim. The insurance carrier was
subrogated on the counterclaim; and (3) The solvency of A-C and the fact that A-C was
insured guaranteed that, if liability were established, PECO's counterclaim would be
satisfied. Since there were no judicial interests involved and the equitable interests
favored entry of judgment, Judge Newcomer was satisfied that this was an infrequent,
harsh case, id. at 6-8.
60. See note 28 supra.
61. Zangardi v. Tobriner, 330 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
62. It should be noted, however, that the courts of appeals do not seem to be
perfect in their review of proper discretion. See cases cited note 41 supra.
63. See cases cited note 13 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
